Options
Famous put sellers
Selling a put is selling crash insurance: you collect a premium up front and pay out if a stock or index falls below the strike. Victor Niederhoffer, LJM and Allianz's Structured Alpha funds each lost most of their money in one crash, but Warren Buffett sold $4.9 billion of index puts and came out ahead. Backtoast backtests put selling on S&P 500 options.
| Seller | Trade | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Victor Niederhoffer, 1997 | Naked S&P 500 puts | $130 million fund wiped out in a day |
| Warren Buffett, 2004 to 2008 | 15- and 20-year index puts | $4.9 billion in premiums, $2.4 billion of earnings by 2017 |
| Karen the Supertrader, 2016 | Index strangles | SEC alleged $50 million+ in unrealized losses |
| LJM, February 2018 | Out-of-the-money S&P 500 futures options | −80%, over $1 billion, in two days |
| OptionSellers.com, November 2018 | Naked natural gas calls | Clients wiped out and owed $35.3 million |
| Allianz Structured Alpha, March 2020 | S&P 500 options hedged with far out-of-the-money puts | Five funds lost 49% to 97% |
How selling a put works
A put gives its buyer the right to sell at the strike price, so the seller keeps the premium and owes the shortfall if the price ends below the strike. With the S&P 500 at 6,000, the seller of a 5,400 put keeps the whole premium if the index expires above 5,400. At 4,800 on expiry the seller owes 600 points, or $60,000 for each SPX contract ($100 a point).
Naked means unhedged. A cash-secured put sets aside the full strike value in cash, so the worst case is buying the index at the strike. Margin lets a seller post a fraction of that, and in a sharp fall the broker issues a margin call and liquidates positions at crash prices.
Retail traders typically sell puts in a brokerage account approved for options. You pick a stock or ETF like SPY, choose a strike and expiry, and place a “sell to open” order on the put, which pays you the premium right away. The broker then holds back cash equal to the strike times 100 shares (a cash-secured put), or a smaller margin deposit if you're approved to sell naked puts.
Why put selling pays most of the time
Index puts usually cost more than they end up paying out. From 1990 to 2018 the VIX (the S&P 500's implied volatility) averaged 19.3% while realized volatility averaged 15.1%, and that 4.2-point gap is the volatility risk premium.
Cboe's S&P 500 PutWrite Index (PUT) sells an at-the-money S&P 500 put every month, secured by Treasury bills. In Oleg Bondarenko's 2019 study for Cboe it rose 1,835% from mid-1986 to 2018 with 9.95% annual volatility, against 14.93% for the S&P 500. In a crash, sellers take the tail loss and tail hedgers like Mark Spitznagel's Universa collect.
Victor Niederhoffer, October 1997
Victor Niederhoffer won five US national squash titles, earned a Chicago finance PhD in 1969 and managed fixed income and currencies for George Soros from 1981 to 1993. In 1979 he turned $50,000 into $20 million in about 18 months. His 1997 memoir The Education of a Speculator was a bestseller.
In 1997 he sold puts on Thai bank stocks, betting the government wouldn't let the banks fail, and lost heavily when the baht collapsed. He'd also sold a large number of naked S&P 500 puts. On October 27, 1997 the Dow fell 554 points (7.2%) and the puts went deep in the money. His $130 million in cash, savings and other stocks went to cover the losses, and when his broker Refco demanded more margin he couldn't pay.
The fund was wiped out in a day. The Dow rebounded the next day, and the firm said a one-day delay in liquidating could have changed the outcome. Niederhoffer mortgaged his house and sold his silver collection at Sotheby's.
About a month before the crash he'd told Nassim Taleb over dinner in Westport, Connecticut that he was selling naked puts. Malcolm Gladwell's 2002 New Yorker article “Blowing Up” contrasts him with Empirica Capital, Taleb and Mark Spitznagel's tail-hedge fund. Niederhoffer told Gladwell, “I can't afford to fail a second time.”
His Matador Fund started in February 2002 with $2 million, grew to $346 million by 2005 and made 56.2% that year. It traded S&P 500 futures and options on margin, fell more than 75% in the 2007 subprime crisis and closed that September. Niederhoffer died on August 4, 2026 at 82.
Warren Buffett's index puts, 2004 to 2008
From 2004 to 2008 Berkshire Hathaway sold 15- and 20-year European puts (payable only on the expiry date) on the S&P 500, FTSE 100, Euro Stoxx 50 and Nikkei 225, and collected and invested $4.9 billion in premiums. Each was struck at the money (the index level that day), and Berkshire could only lose the full $37.1 billion if all four indexes went to zero.
Buffett's own example: sell a $1 billion 15-year S&P 500 put with the index at 1,300, collect perhaps $100 million to $150 million, and pay $100 million if the index ends 10% lower at 1,170.
His 2008 letter argued Black-Scholes, the standard option pricing model, overvalues decades-long puts. Its price for a 100-year $1 billion S&P 500 put at the 903 strike came to $2.5 million. Buffett put the expected loss at $5 million (a 1% chance of a 50% fall), so the premium only had to earn 0.7% a year to cover it. “Would you like to borrow money for 100 years at a 0.7% rate?” he asked.
At the end of 2008 Black-Scholes put Berkshire's liability at $10 billion, a $5.1 billion paper loss. Only a few contracts required collateral, and even in late 2008 Berkshire posted less than 1% of its securities portfolio. Neither side could settle early, so no margin call could force Berkshire out at the bottom.
In his 2002 letter Buffett called derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction” and warned about collateral calls. Bloomberg reported the puts added $2.4 billion to Berkshire's earnings from 2008 to 2017, and substantially all of them had expired by the end of 2022.
Karen the Supertrader, 2014 to 2016
Karen Bruton, a CPA in Nashville, became “Karen the Supertrader” on tastytrade, which aired four featured interviews with her by August 2014. Her firm Hope Advisors sold index strangles on the S&P 500, Nasdaq 100 and Russell 2000. A short strangle sells an out-of-the-money put and an out-of-the-money call, so it profits while the index stays between the two strikes.
On May 31, 2016 the SEC sued Bruton and Hope Advisors. Its complaint said the firm's only pay was a monthly incentive fee on profits, and that it timed trades to book profits at month-end and push losses into the next month. The SEC put the unrealized losses at more than $50 million. In options, the usual way to push a loss forward is rolling: buy back the losing option and sell a later-dated one.
In September 2018 Bruton and Hope Advisors settled without admitting the allegations and paid $1.24 million in disgorgement and a $250,000 penalty.
LJM and Volmageddon, February 2018
Anthony Caine's LJM ran a mutual fund, the LJM Preservation and Growth Fund, and several private funds that used margin to sell out-of-the-money options on S&P 500 futures. The SEC's complaint calls it “the equivalent of selling insurance to other investors primarily against declines in the S&P 500 futures market.” The funds bought some close-to-the-money options as a partial hedge but stayed net short. Assets grew from about $450 million in February 2016 to about $1.3 billion in February 2018.
Over Friday, February 2 and Monday, February 5, 2018 the S&P 500 fell more than 6% and the VIX rose 177%. At the close on Monday the funds' futures broker liquidated every remaining position to meet margin requirements, and LJM lost more than $1 billion, about 80% of its funds' value. That evening Credit Suisse's XIV, an exchange-traded note that bet against VIX futures, shrank from $1.9 billion to $63 million. The crash is known as Volmageddon.
In 2021 the SEC and CFTC charged Caine and co-manager Anish Parvataneni with misleading investors about risk, including stress tests that put the mutual fund's worst daily loss at 20%. Caine denied fraud and said he personally lost more than $100 million on February 5 and 6. The defendants were ordered to pay $6.0 million.
OptionSellers.com, November 2018
James Cordier's OptionSellers.com in Tampa ran naked option-selling accounts for 290 clients, and he co-wrote The Complete Guide to Option Selling (McGraw-Hill) with Michael Gross. In late 2018 its accounts had sold natural gas calls and crude oil puts, so they lost if gas rallied or crude fell.
On November 14 natural gas jumped 18%. The next day OptionSellers emailed clients under the subject “Catastrophic Loss Event” that their money was gone and they could owe more to its clearing broker, INTL FCStone. Clients held managed accounts instead of fund shares, so their losses could go below zero. FCStone said they owed a collective $35.3 million, and Bloomberg put total losses above $150 million.
In a 10-minute YouTube video Cordier told clients, “You are my family and I'm sorry that this rogue wave capsized our boat.”
Allianz Structured Alpha, March 2020
About 114 institutional investors, including pension funds, put about $11 billion into Allianz Global Investors' Structured Alpha funds. The funds sold S&P 500 options for income and promised to stay hedged against sharp falls as net buyers of puts. Pension fund lawsuits said the funds weren't meaningfully hedged when the COVID crash came.
In the first quarter of 2020 five Structured Alpha funds lost 49% to 97%, and Allianz liquidated Structured Alpha 1000 and 1000 Plus at the end of March. The SEC said the managers had doctored risk reports, in one case cutting a market-crash loss from −42.15% to −4.15%. Malachite Capital, a short-volatility hedge fund, also blew up that March.
Allianz Global Investors US pleaded guilty to securities fraud in May 2022 and agreed to pay about $6 billion, more than $5 billion of it as restitution. Lead manager Gregoire Tournant pleaded guilty to investment adviser fraud in 2024 and was sentenced to 18 months of home confinement.
Why the blowups happened
Niederhoffer, LJM and OptionSellers.com were all liquidated on margin calls at the bottom of a crash. Buffett held the premiums, posted almost no collateral and couldn't be made to settle before expiry, so Berkshire rode out a $10 billion mark-to-market liability at the end of 2008.
Put selling on Backtoast
Backtoast's engine backtests put selling on S&P 500 options, from cash-secured puts to strangles and put credit spreads. The drafting feature tests strikes, expiries, margin and position sizing, and flags edges smaller than costs, overfit rules and more. Backtoast's runs of the Cboe cash-secured put and a 16-delta SPY short strangle made 4.3% and 10.5% a year but failed our full tradeability audit.
Niederhoffer's story is from Malcolm Gladwell's “Blowing Up” (The New Yorker, April 22 and 29, 2002), the Associated Press via the Spokesman-Review (October 30, 1997) and the New York Times obituary via the Boston Globe. Buffett's puts are from Berkshire's 2008 and 2002 letters, its 2022 annual report and Bloomberg. The volatility figures are from Cboe. Karen Bruton's case is from SEC Litigation Release 24285 and tastytrade, LJM from the SEC and its complaint, XIV from Bloomberg, OptionSellers.com from CNBC and Palisades Hudson, and Allianz from the SEC, Institutional Investor and Insurance Journal.
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